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Probate Code Amendments
BY FRANCIS J. EBERLY*
This review of new legislation affecting probate law and pro-
cedure will he confined mainly to legislation sponsored by the Pro-
bate and Trust Law Committee of the Ohio State Bar Association.
It will be discussed section by section. Without going into detail
concerning other new legislation, brief comment only will be made
on some of the amendments which are of interest to the practicing
lawyer.
SECTION 2105.21 (10503-18)
PRESUMPTION OF ORDER OF DEATH. - This first amend-
ment, from the standpoint of the practicing lawyer, is one of the
most drastic amendments to our probate law since the adoption of
the 1932 Probate Code. It not only involves the statute of descent
and distribution but the construction of wills, and most importantly
it involves the proper drafting of wills.
There is no change in the wording of the first sentence of the
section, so the law remains the same when there is no evidence of
the order in which the death of two or more persons occurred. The
amendment, however, does away altogether with any mention of
death from a common accident. It simply provides that when a sur-
viving spouse, heir, or legatee dies within thirty days after the
death of the decedent, such persons do not participate at all in the
estate of such decedent. This postpones the definite vesting of all
estates for thirty days after the death of the decedent and con-
sequently it is a very important exception to the statute of descent
and distribution. Orno REV. CODE § 2105.06.
It is important to note, however, that this section does not apply
to a beneficiary of a testamentary trust, except in the case where
there is no evidence of the order in which the death of the testator
and such beneficiary occurred.
It became the general opinion of lawyers that it was not pos-
sible to so draft a will that the testator's estate could be taken out
of the operation of the old statute. This is what prompted the Pro-
bate and Trust Law Committee to sponsor the amendment to this
section. By being able to provide by will for a distribution different
from the provisions of this section it is possible to take advantage
of the marital deduction allowed under the federal estate tax law,
where the surviving spouse dies within thirty days of the death of
the testator. Accordingly, this sentence was inserted in the section,
viz: "This section shall not apply in the case of wills wherein pro-
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vision has been made for distribution of property different from
the provisions of this section."
It will be apparent at once to the practicing lawyer that this
change could materially affect the interpretation of wills which
he has heretofore drawn. It would, therefore, be well for lawyers
to review the wills they have drawn and if there is any question
at all in their minds as to the intention of their clients in the light
of this new amendment, such wills should be re-drafted. Likewise,
in the drafting of new wills under this amendment, a lawyer can-
not be too careful in his phraseology to make sure that the will
clearly expresses the intention of the testator and places the will
beyond the necessity of a court construction.
SECTION 2107.39 (10504-55) (10504-48)
ELECTION BY SURVIVING SPOUSE.- This amendment
was adopted for the purpose of avoiding uncertainty and litigation
concerning the question of the intention of the testator when the
surviving spouse elects to take under the statute of descent and dis-
tribution rather than under the will. In such cases if the surviving
spouse is given a life estate, the question invariably occurs: Do
the remainder or other interests accelerate as though the surviving
spouse had died? To avoid litigation over this question the amend-
ment specifically provides that the estate shall be disposed of as
though the spouse had predeceased the testator, unless the will
shall expressly provide that there shall be no acceleration of re-
mainder or other interests. Therefore, under this amendment the
testator is forced to make clear his intention in the event the sur-
viving spouse should elect to take under the statute of descent and
distribution, otherwise there shall be an acceleration of remainder
and other interests.
The second paragraph is a replacement of Section 10504-58
of the General Code. The reference at the beginning of the Section
to Section 1050448 is in error.
SECTION 2107.41 (10504-60)
FAILURE TO MAKE ELECTION; PRESUMPTION. -This
section was amended to offset the effect of the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Raleigh v. Raleigh, 153 Ohio St. 160
(1946). In that case the surviving spouse had died before the pro-
bate of the will, and the court ruled that after the probate of the
will the probate court was authorized to make such an election
for the estate of the deceased surviving spouse as would be most
advantageous to his estate. Under this amendment, even if the sur-
viving spouse dies before the probate of the will, such spouse shall
be conclusively presumed to have elected to take under the will.
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SECTION 2107.43 (10504-56, 10504-59)
ELECTION MADE IN PERSON. - This amendment was sug-
gested by The Ohio Association of Probate Court Judges. In 1951
the Association sponsored an amendment to General Code Section
11483, now Revised Code Section 2315.37, which authorized the
probate courts to appoint as referees, deputy clerks who are at-
torneys at law admitted to the practice in the state of Ohio. This
amendment permits the election of a surviving spouse under a
will to be made in person before such a referee as well as before
the probate judge. Since the year 1947 the surviving spouse has
been required under the law to appear in person before the probate
judge to make an election. The inconvenience created by this re-
quirement soon became apparent, especially in the larger counties.
It was often found that the probate judge, busy with the trial of
cases and other duties, was not readily available to take the elec-
tion of a surviving spouse. Under this amendment the probate judge
can appoint a qualified deputy to take these elections when he is
otherwise engaged.
SECTION 2109.13 (10506-23, 10506-24, 10506-25)
DEPOSIT OF SECURITIES IN LIEU OF BOND. -This
amendment provides for the deposit of any suitable personal prop-
erty in lieu of bond. The old section limited what could be de-
posited to certificates of stocks, bonds, notes, or other securities.
It was felt that this enumeration in the old section did not cover
such items of personal property as certificates of deposit, bank ac-
counts and money. Therefore, the broad term, "suitable personal
property" was used. This term could also include diamonds, jewelry,
and even small works of art which under the old law could only
be deposited in a museum under Revised Code Section 2109.14
(10506-25a).
Under the old law if any security was withdrawn from the
custody of the bank, the original bond of the fiduciary would have
had to be increased if the bond did not equal twice the value of the
security withdrawn and the personal property in the hands of the
fiduciary. Under this amendment the court may find that the origi-
nal bond of the fiduciary is sufficient, having regard for the dis-
position to be made of the property, its value as related to the total
value of the estate and the period of time it will remain in the
possession of the fiduciary; otherwise, the court may determine
the amount of additional bond the fiduciary shall be required to
furnish.
The last sentence of the section is a new and important pro-
vision. It provides that neither the fiduciary nor his sureties shall
be liable for any loss to the estate resulting from a deposit author-
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ized by the court under this section if the fiduciary has acted in
good faith.
SECTION 2111.23 (10507-26)
GUARDIAN AD LITEM. -The amendment to this section
was induced by an article this reviewer wrote for the Practicing
Law Institute of the Ohio State Bar Association for the 1950 Spring
meetings, which article was entitled, "Settlement of Accounts in the
Probate Court." The article called attention to the fact that by
virtue of Section 10507-26 of the General Code the probate court
was empowered to appoint only a guardian of the estate, or of the
person and estate, of a minor or person under disability, where no
guardian had theretofore been appointed, for the purpose of repre-
senting them in any proceeding in the probate court in which they
were interested. In such a situation the section did not authorize
the appointment of a guardian ad litem, but it was quite generally
felt that it did. So that there would be no question about the mean-
ing of the section, it was amended to authorize the probate court to
appoint either a guardian or a guardian ad litem.
The clause "suit or proceeding in which the guardian is per-
sonally interested" has been changed to "suit or proceeding in which
the guardian has an adverse interest." This wording is more definite
and also conforms to the wording in Revised Code Section 2307.13
(11249) found in the Code of Civil Procedure.
SEcTIoN 2113.23 (10509-24)
SALES OF FORMER EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR
VALID. - The old law provides that when letters of administration
are revoked, or an executor or administrator is removed or re-
signs, or a will is declared invalid, all previous sales made by him
shall be valid as to such executor or administrator. In the amended
section the contingency of the death of the executor or administra-
tor and also the contingency of a surviving spouse electing to take
under the law rather than under the will have been added. The
statute is broadened to include leases and encumbrances, and ex-
tends the protection afforded the executor or administrator to
purchasers, lessees, encumbrancers, and all other parties, dealing
with the fiduciary for value in good faith, and all .parties claiming
under any of them.
This amendment was suggested by title companies as they
were not sure that a purchaser was protected in his title the same
as the executor or administrator was under the old law.
SECTION 2113.50 (10509-226)
COMPLETION OF DECEDENT'S CONTRACT TO BUY
LAND. - The old section dealt with the alteration and cancellation
of a contract to purchase land and with the compelling of a con-
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veyance of land purchased under a contract. The old section was
poorly drawn and was badly in need of revision.
The amended section deals only with proceedings to complete,
and for the alteration and cancellation of a contract to purchase
land. The section is patterned after Revised Code Sections 2113.48
and 2113.49 (10509-224 and 10509-225), which sections were revised
by the legislature in 1949 at the instance of the Probate and Trust
Law Committee. The first paragraph provides for the procedure for
the completion of the contract and the second paragraph for its
alteration and cancellation.
For the completion of a contract an application is filed by the
executor or administrator, or by the surviving spouse, or any heir,
or any devisee having an interest in the contract. Notice of the
hearing on the application must be given to all interested persons.
If the court is satisfied that it would be for the best interests of
the estate it may, with the consent of the vendor, authorize the
executor or administrator to complete the contract; or the court
may authorize the persons entitled to the interest of the decedent
in the contract to complete it.
For the alteration or cancellation of a contract a petition is filed
by the executor or administrator, or by the surviving spouse, or
any heir, or any devisee having an interest in the contract. All
interested persons must be made parties defendant. If the court is
satisfied that it would be for the best interests of the estate it may,
with the consent of the vendor, authorize the executor or adminis-
trator to agree to the alteration or cancellation of the contract.
The amendment does not include any procedure for compelling
the conveyance of land under a contract of purchase. The heirs or
devisees are generally the ones interested in the contract as it rep-
resents real estate. No statute is necessary to compel the completion
in equity for specific performance.
SEcTioN 2117.23 (10509-78)
YEAR'S ALLOWANCE WHEN DECEDENT IS NON-RESI-
DENT.-This section was entirely rewritten. Under the old law
the probate court had the discretion to allow a year's allowance
out of Ohio property owned by a non-resident decedent only where
the laws of the state of his residence made no provision for year's
allowance for widows and children of resident decedents. This
limitation does not appear in the amended section. The section
recites that the probate court may set off a year's allowance, having
due regard for the laws of the state of decedent's residence as
to its provisions for widows and children, the assets of the estate
and the amount the widow and children may be expected to re-
ceive in the state of decedent's residence, and any other facts and
circumstances which may have a bearing on the case.
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The amendment requires that ancillary administration pro-
ceedings be had, and prior to the approval of the inventory and
appraisement that the fiduciary notify the widow and children
under the age of eighteen that they have sixty days after the ap-
proval of the inventory to apply for a year's allowance out of the
Ohio property. Notice of the hearing on such application may be
given to such persons as the court may require.
SECTION 2129.10 (10511-12)
PROCEDURE. - This section is in the chapter on ancillary
administration and provides that the procedure in ancillary ad-
ministration shall be the same as in estates of resident decedents.
The second paragraph of the section is new and provides that all
rights, powers, and duties authorized by Revised Code Section
2117.23 (preceding section) relating to a year's allowance shall be
available to the widow and children of a non-resident decedent but
that the duty to notify them of their right to apply for a year's
allowance shall be exercised by the ancillary administrator.
It is important to note that an ancillary administrator has an
additional duty to perform which was not required under the old
law. Failure to perform this duty might make the ancillary adminis-
trator liable for any loss that the widow or children might suffer
as the result of not being notified in time of their rights in the Ohio
property.
This amendment was made to this section in the chapter on
ancillary administration so that the procedure required under
Revised Code Section 2117.23 would be called to the attention of
lawyers representing ancillary administrators. This is an important
duty of the ancillary administrator which is new and should not
be overlooked.
SECTION 2107.181
DENIAL OF ADMISSION TO PROBATE. -This is an en-
tirely new section and has been inserted after the section headed:
"Admission to probate." Under this new section if the court denies
the probate of a will, an interlocutory order denying probate is
entered and the matter is continued for further hearing. The court
shall then order that not less than ten days notice of such further
hearing be given to all persons named in the will, including the exe-
cutor. At such hearing anyone interested in having the will admit-
ted to probate may call or subpoena witnesses and examine or
cross-examine them. Thereupon the court shall either enter a final
order refusing to probate such instrument or revoke its inter-
locutory order and admit the will to probate.
This new procedure eliminates the uncertainty under the old
law of an order denying probate of an instrument. All persons
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named in a will are required by law to be notified of the admission
of the will to probate (Ormo REv. CODE § 2107.19, Omo GEN. CODE
§ 10504-23) but, under the old law, when an instrument was denied
probate no such notice was required. Consequently, the Supreme
Court has held, under the old law, that where admission of a will
to probate has been refused, persons having no notice of the pro-
ceedings and refusal until too late to perfect an appeal from the
order of refusal, are not concluded thereby, but may repropound
the will notwithstanding the former order of refusal has not been
vacated. Feuchter v. Keyl, et al. 48 Ohio St. 357 (1891) State, ex
rel. Young v. Morrow, 131 Ohio St. 266 (1936). Under these de-
cisions it was possible for an estate to be completely administered
as an intestate estate only to have such administration set aside
years later and the estate re-administered under the will. In order
to prevent this uncertain and embarrassing situation this new sec-
tion was adopted.
SEcTION 2109.37
ADDITIONAL INVESTMENTS BY FIDUCIARIES. - This is
an entirely new section which augments the existing statute de-
fining legal investments (OiO REV. CODE § 2109.37 Omo GEN. CODE
10506-41). Since the year 1932 the investments of fiduciaries have
been limited to what has been termed the "legal list". This section
now permits fiduciaries to invest up to thirty-five percent of the
market value of the fund held by them in securities which are not
included in the statutory list. The conditions upon which such in-
vestments may be made are that the securities may be lawfully sold
in Ohio and are such securities as would be acquired by prudent
men of discretion and intelligence in such matters who are seeking
a reasonable income and the preservation of their capital. This is
what is called the "prudent man rule" which exists in varying de-
grees among the majority of states. It is to be observed that it is
not necessary to make application to the probate court for authority
to make such investments.
MENTAL CASES
House Bill 142 amends several sections of Chapter 5123 which
deals with mental cases. The more important changes are as fol-
lows: The law now definitely provides that one of the places in
which the probate court may order a mentally ill person detained
is a receiving hospital wherein such person may be observed and
treated prior to his hearing before the probate court. It is no longer
required that the probate court set a mental illness case for hearing
on the next business day after a person is detained but may exer-
cise his discretion as to when the case shall be set for hearing.
Under this new procedure a patient can immediately be placed
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under observation and treatment in a receiving hospital prior to
the hearing.
This is an important step forward in the treatment of persons
alleged to be mentally ill; in some cases it is possible, by the time
the person is brought before the court for hearing, that the mental
disturbance shall have been removed and consequently the court
could, upon the hearing, dismiss the affidavit of mental illness and
order the person discharged. This will forestall a finding of mental
illness in such cases. However, if an immediate hearing before the
court is demanded the court is required to hear the case within
forty-eight hours.
Another important provision is that a patient in a hospital un-
der the control of the division of mental hygiene may be discharged
as recovered when such patient is no longer mentally ill, feeble-
minded, or epileptic. Such a discharge as recovered or a discharge
as competent by the Veterans Administration shall operate as a
restoration to competency. Such discharges under the new amend-
ments obviate the necessity of proceeding under Revised Code




LIABILITY FOR PAYMENT OF TAXES VOID, WHEN. -
This is an entirely new section. Under this section the liability for
the payment of inheritance taxes, including collateral inheritance
taxes, together with any lien created thereby, shall become void ten
years after the date of death of the decedent, or two years after the
effective date of the section, whichever shall be later. The effective
date of this section is October 13, 1953. Not only does the lien creat-
ed by the tax on the property of the decedent become void, but
also the liability of the fiduciary of the estate for the payment of
the tax become void. However, if there is any litigation pending
for the determination or collection of the tax, the liability or lien
does not become void until one year after the determination of
the litigation.
QUALIFICATIONS AND SALARIES OF PROBAT9 JUDGES
Senate Bill 42 raised the qualifications of judges of the probate
court to equal those of judges of the court of common pleas. To be
qualified to serve as probate judge one must now have been admit-
ted to practice as an attorney at law in this state for a period of at
least six years immediately preceding his election, or have served
as probate judge immediately prior to his election. This was effected
by amendment to Revised Code Section 2101.02 (10501-1).
This bill also increased the salaries of judges of the probate
court to equal those of judges of the court of common pleas. This
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was accomplished by including probate judges in the sections of
the code providing for the salaries of judges of the common pleas
court (OHIo REV. CODE § § 141.04 and 141.05 Owo GEN. CODE 2251
and 2252.) In this way the cumbersome method of computing the
salaries of probate judges has been abolished and they will be paid
from the same sources as the common pleas judges.
This legislation will go a long way toward maintaining the
level of the probate courts throughout the state. For economic
reasons many of the judges have resigned to go back in the prac-
tice of law. With this increase in salary the office of probate judge
will at least be as attractive to lawyers as a place on the common
pleas bench. This equality both in the salary and the qualifications
for office of the two judgeships will also have a tendency to dispel
the erroneous conception that some people still have that the
probate court is considered in law to be an inferior court to that
of the common pleas. (Ohio Rev. Code § 2101.42, Ono GEN. CODE
10501-50).
